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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20060603-CA
v.

Not Incarcerated

JEFFREY K. JOHNSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this
interlocutory appeal from a court of record in a criminal case involving a third degree
felony charge.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the district court err in denying Johnson's motion to quash the order binding
Johnson over on a charge of threatening a judge, when the charge was premised on a
private telephone conversation between Johnson and his divorce lawyer regarding
Johnson's divorce, and in the absence of any proof that Johnson intended to influence a
judge with this private conversation?
Standard of review: The trial court's ruling was directed at the elements of the
offense (R. 229). The preliminary hearing involved no assessment of witness credibility,

because the State's case consisted of a tape-recorded telephone conversation and a written
summary of a telephone conversation, which were presented by proffer of what the
investigating officer would have testified to, had he been called (R. 31-32; R. 252: 9-11).
Hence, this Court may address the trial court's legal reasoning, and the propriety of
quashing the bindover order for correctness, and need not draw evidentiary inferences in
the State's favor. See State v. Bradshaw. 2004 UT App 298,1j 8 n.3, 99 P.3d 359 (where
prosecution did not call witnesses, but relied on stipulated facts, the prosecution was not
entitled to inferences drawn in its favor on review of the bindover order), cert, granted,
109 P.3d 804 (Utah 2005).
The issue was raised and ruled on in the lower courts (R. 36-50, 55-60, 61-65, 99,
119-134, 162-170, 229; R. 253: 5-12).
2. Did the district court err in denying Johnson's motion in limine seeking to bar
his divorce lawyer from testifying about his private conversation with her regarding his
divorce?
Standard of review: The trial court's ruling turns on the interpretation of the
attorney-client privilege (R. 224-228). Accordingly, this Court may review this question
of law without deference, for correctness. See, e.g. State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ^j 23,
137P.3d716.
The issue was raised and ruled on in the lower court (R. 147-159, 218-222, 224228; R. 253: 12-23).
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STATUTE AND RULE
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-316 and Utah Rule of Evidence 504 are copied in the
addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
The State charged Johnson in Sixth District Court with two counts of threatening a
judge, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-8-316 (R. 6-7).
At the preliminary hearing, the first count was premised on a written statement of
Johnson's divorce attorney regarding a telephone conversation between her and Johnson
on September 13, 2005, and the second count was premised on a tape recording of a
telephone conversation between her and Johnson on September 16, 2005 (R. 31-32, 252:
9-11).
Following the preliminary hearing, Magistrate Wallace A. Lee dismissed the first
count for insufficient evidence, but bound over on the second count {R. 61-63, 99). He
transferred jurisdiction to Salt Lake County pursuant to a motion by defense counsel,
because at the time of the telephone calls, Johnson was in the state of New Mexico, and
his divorce lawyer was in Salt Lake County (R. 64-65).
The State then charged Johnson in Salt Lake County, again alleging two counts of
retaliating against a judge (R. 135-36), and moved to amend the information to premise
two counts against two judges on one date, September 16, 2005 (R. 143-45).
3

Johnson opposed amendment of the information and moved to quash the bindover
order (R. 36-50,55-60,61-65,99, 119-134, 162-170; R. 253: 5-12). Judge Henriod has
yet to rule on the amendment of the information, but denied Johnson's motion to quash in
an order copied in the addendum, which states, in relevant part:
Whether or not Fixe! adds an element to 78-8-316(1) which is not in the
statute the issue raised is a question for the jury.
[Sic] (R. 229).
Johnson filed a motion in limine invoking the attorney-client privilege to prevent
Johnson's divorce lawyer from testifying regarding their conversation (R. 147-159, 218222, 224-228; R. 253: 12-23). Judge Henriod denied the motion in a memorandum
decision which is in the addendum to this brief (R. 224-228).
This Court granted Johnson's petition for interlocutory appeal from the trial
court's orders denying the motion to quash and the motion in limine. See Order dated
August 4, 2006.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 16, 2005, Johnson's divorce lawyer, Joy Jelte, called Johnson and
surreptitiously recorded the ensuing conversation (R. 253: 17, 64-65). This call
concerned Johnson's pending divorce, and there was no evidence that Johnson expected
or intended for his lawyer to record or share the substance of this call with anyone (R.
254: 2-24). The conversation was initiated by the attorney, who wished to lead Johnson
4

to repeat statements he had made in an earlier conversation so she could record them,
unbeknownst to her client (R. 253: 16-18). She began the conversation by inquiring
about Johnson's checklist, and he responded by inquiring about the protective order, his
alimony, and his 401K (R. 254: 2-4). They discussed his child support and visitation, the
property division, the protective order, whether he would exercise his right to appeal,
whether he could afford to pay attorney fees for an appeal, the potential for reconciliation
with his wife, the proper attorney's fees for her lawyer, whether the lawyers and judges in
his case were following the law, whether there was perjury, ex parte contact with a judge
or unethical conduct involved in his case, how justice should be administered, and what
the potential consequences would be to him if he hurt someone (R. 254: 4-23). The
majority of the conversation was interspersed with his heated expressions of frustration
with the judges and two lawyers who had been involved in the case (R. 254: 1-24). His
most imminent threat was to come to court in a T-shirt and Levis (R. 254: 23). When
Jelte told him to leave his guns home, he told her that he and his crew dealt with matters
of life and death every day and that he was not stupid (R. 254: 23). He told her he would
play by the same rules as the judges and lawyers (R. 254: 23), and that the day would
come when there would be justice, but that it would not be for a while (R. 254: 21). The
conversation ended with him remarking that he did not have anything planned in the near
future (R: 254: 24).
A full discussion of Johnson's statements which may fairly be interpreted as

5

threats, and the absence of evidence to suggest that he intended for his statements to reach
or influence a judge is discussed in Point I of the Argument section of the brief.
While the tape of the conversation is apparently incomplete (R. 254: 9, 13, 24),
the entire transcript of the tape is in the addendum to this brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The offense of threatening a judge requires proof of intent to influence a judge
with a threat. The telephone conversation wherein Johnson made the alleged threats was
a private one between him and his attorney. Because there is no evidence that he intended
this confidential conversation to be shared with anyone, let alone for anything he said
during this conversation to influence a judge, the evidence did not support a reasonable
belief that Johnson harbored the requisite mens rea to sustain the charge of threatening a
judge. Because the State failed to present credible evidence of this key element of the
offense at the preliminary hearing, the trial court should have granted Johnson's motion to
quash the bindover order.
Assuming arguendo that the case proceeds to trial, this Court should hold that Jelte
may not testify regarding her conversation with Johnson, because Johnson's intention in
participating in the conversation was "for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of
professional legal services" to himself, and is thus the conversation is privileged under
Utah Rule of Evidence 504.
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ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
DENYING JOHNSON'S MOTION TO QUASH THE
BINDOVER ORDER.

While magistrates issuing bindover orders are traditionally afforded some
deference, in part because of their advantaged position in assessing the credibility of
witnesses who appear before them, e.g.. Virgin, 2006 UT 29 at ^ 28-34,1 in the instant
matter, the State's case at the preliminary hearing consisted of the taped phone
conversation transcribed in the addendum to this brief (R. 31-32; R. 252: 9-11). Hence,
this Court may review the magistrate's bindover order and address the trial court's legal
reasoning in denying the motion to quash for correctness, and need not draw evidentiary
inferences in the State's favor. See State v. Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, Tf 8 n.3, 99
P.3d 359 (where prosecution did not call witnesses, but relied on stipulated facts, the
prosecution was not entitled to inferences drawn in its favor on review of the bindover
order), cert granted, 109 P.3d 804 (Utah 2005).
A bindover order must be supported by credible evidence of each element of the
offense. Rg,, State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ^ 20, 137 P.3d 787. In order for preliminary
hearings to serve their essential function of "ferreting out groundless prosecutions,"

!

This portion of the Virgin opinion discusses a four factor test for choosing
appellate standards of review. See id. The Utah Supreme Court recently revised the four
factor test, and thus modified this aspect of Virgin, but still recognizes the ability of a
judge to observe witnesses and assess their credibility as a basis for deference. See State
v. Levin. 2006 UT 50, Tflf 25-31, 2006 WL 2578197.
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bindover orders may not be premised on speculation, but must be founded on evidence
supporting a reasonable belief that the defendant committed each element of the crime
charged. Id. atffi[20, 21.
A. THE OFFENSE OF THREATENING A JUDGE REQUIRES PROOF OF INTENT
TO INFLUENCE A JUDGE WITH THE THREAT.
It is elementary that criminal offenses require the joint operation of act and intent,
and that absent proof of mens rea with regard to each element of an offense, there is
normally no crime proved, unless the offense at issue involves well-defined strict liability
See, e.g.. State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 728 (Utah 1984). See also Utah Code Ann. § 762-101 (1) ("A person is not guilty of an offense unless the person?s conduct is prohibited
by law; and the person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence,
or with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense, as the
definition of the offense requires; or the person's acts constitute an offense involving
strict liability.").
The offense at issue here is defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-316 as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if the person threatens
to assault, kidnap, or murder a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons
and Parole with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the judge
or member of the board while engaged in the performance of the judge's or
member's official duties or with the intent to retaliate against the judge or
member on account of the performance of those official duties.

The gravamen of the third degree felony offense with which Johnson stands
charged is making the threat (the actus reus) with the specific intent to impede,
8

intimidate, or interfere with the judge while engaged in the performance of the judge's
official duties, or with the specific intent to retaliate against the judge on account of the
performance of those official duties (the mens red). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-316(1),
supra. This is reflected in the plain language of subsection (l), 2 and is confirmed by
reviewing subsections (2) and (3),3 which define other crimes with the same mens rea, but
different actus reuses. See id.4
If there is no foreseeable way that the threat would be communicated to the judge,
the requisite intent for the third degree felony of threatening a judge is lacking, because a
2

Out of deference to the Legislature's lawmaking domain, courts routinely interpret
statutes in accordance with their plain language. See, e.g.. State v. Rivera. 933 P.2d 1344,
1345 (Utah 1977).
3

In interpreting a statute, it is appropriate for the Court to view the statute as a
whole, to insure that the objective of the statute is properly ascertained, and that the
separate provisions are interpreted harmoniously. See, e.g.. Sentry Investigations Inc. v.
Davis. 841 P.2d 732, 734 (Utah App. 1992).
4

Subsections (2) and (3) provide:

(2) A person is guilty of a second degree felony if the person commits an
assault on a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole with the
intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the judge or member of the
board while engaged in the performance of the judge's or member's official
duties, or with the intent to retaliate against the judge or member on account
of the performance of those official duties.
(3) A person is guilty of a first degree felony if the person commits
aggravated assault or attempted murder on a judge or a member of the
Board of Pardons and Parole with the purpose to impede, intimidate, or
interfere with the judge or member of the board while engaged in the
performance of the judge's or member's official duties or with the purpose
to retaliate against the judge or member on account of the performance of
those official duties.
9

person cannot utter a threat with the intent or expectation that the threat will influence or
punish the judge if there is no foreseeable way for the judge to learn of the threat.
See State v. FixeL 945 P.2d 149 (Utah App. 1997).
In FixeL the defendant appeared in the Fourth District Court for a bail hearing. He
was seated in the jury box awaiting his return to jail and was apparently upset about the
bail determination. As the defendant was being lead to a transport vehicle, he stood
immediately behind an officer and loudly stated, "When I get out the judge is dead." His
voice could be heard up to fifteen feet away. The officer thereafter informed the court of
the threat. See id. at 150. In appealing from his conviction for threatening a judge, the
defendant alleged prosecutorial misconduct for the prosecutor's argument that he did not
have to prove that Fixel intended to kill the judge, but only had to prove that Fixel uttered
the threat with the intent to retaliate. Id.
This Court began by recognizing that the charging statute "makes it a crime to
threaten a judge with the intent to interfere with the performance of a judge's official
duties or the intent to retaliate against the judge for the performance of official duties."
945 P.2d at 151. This Court rejected Fixel's contention that the charging statute required
proof of intent to carry out the threat, because the statute contained no language
indicating that intent to carry out the assault, kidnaping or murder or to take action "in
that general direction" was essential to the crime. 945 P.2d at 151-52. The Court found
that Fixel's utterance of the threat within the earshot of the bailiff was sufficient proof of
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his intent to influence the judge, and that the evidence thus sustained his conviction and
supported the prosecutor's argument, because it was indeed irrelevant whether Fixel truly
intended to kill the judge. The Court explained:
As indicated, whether Fixel "really" had the intention to do any such thing,
or whether he made the threat knowing he would never lift a finger against
the judge, is irrelevant under the statute. The jury was free to infer that
when Fixel uttered his threat, he fully expected it would be conveyed to the
judge, as it in fact was, and intended that it would intimidate the judge in
the course of his duties, perhaps prompting some more favorable treatment
when Fixel next appeared before him, or, as actually happened, prompting
the judge to withdraw from cases involving Fixel.
Alternatively, the jury could infer that Fixel uttered the threat,
expecting it would be passed along to the judge, intending "to retaliate
against the judge" for how he had performed his duties vis-a-vis Fixel. In
this regard, "to retaliate" does not connote some retributive physical
violence. Rather, it contemplates the simple concept of "pay back." See
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1938 (1986) (defining
retaliate to mean "to return the like for; repay or requite in kind" and "to
return like for like"). The judge, by his action, had upset Fixel. By
threatening the judge, Fixel could perhaps upset him as well, thereby fully
accomplishing the "pay back" that is the essence of retaliation.
Id at 152 (footnotes omitted).
The conclusion of the Fixel Court in requiring an expectation that the judge would
learn of the threat is sound. One cannot intend to influence a judge (whether by
impeding, intimidating or paying him or her back) with a threat that the person does not
intend the judge to learn of. See id. See also United States v. Fenton, 30 F.Supp.2d 520,
527-28 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (reversing conviction under 18 U.S.C.A. § 115, the federal
statute the Fixel Court recognized as parallel to Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-316, because the
11

defendant told an insurance adjuster that he was going to kill a congressman, when there
was no evidence that the insurance agent would convey the remark to the congressman,
and thus there was no proof of intent to impede, interfere with, intimidate or retaliate
against congressman in the course of his official duties). See also State v. Lucero, 2002
UT App 135, TJ 11 n.l, 47 P.3d 107 (in refusing to address a claim of insufficient
evidence to sustain a conviction for threatening a public official, the Court noted the
appellant's failure to cite Fixel, which the Court cited for the parenthetical proposition,
"holding mere utterance of a threat, without specified intent, could not satisfy Utah Code
Ann. §76-8-316(1999).").
B. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT JOHNSON HARBORED THE
REQUISITE INTENT TO INFLUENCE A JUDGE WITH HIS STATEMENTS.
In the instant matter, the State presented no evidence that Johnson uttered any
remark with the intent that the remark would reach or influence any judge in any way.
Rather, the State only proved various inflammatory statements made by an angry client to
his lawyer in the course of discussing the subject matter of the legal representation - the
divorce case. Because there was no evidence that Johnson uttered any threat with the
requisite intent to influence any judge, the trial court should have quashed the bindover
order. See Fixel and Virgin, supra.
While it does not appear legally necessary to do so, Johnson will marshal the
evidence which supports the issuance of the bindover for threatening a judge, which
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requires proof of a threat to assault, kidnap or murder a judge made with the intent to
impede, intimidate or interfere with a judge's performance of his official duties, or with
the intent to retaliate against a judge on account of the judge's performance of his official
duties. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-316 and State v. Fixel 945 P.2d 149, (Utah
App. 1997), discussed further infra.
Johnson does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to establish probable
cause that he made requisite threatening statements regarding judges in Sevier County.
The following statements could support such a finding:
[H]e's going to have what's coming to him.
All of the Mowers - yeah[.]
(R.254:6).
I've seen firsthand the corruption in Severe County, and you know what?
I'm not going to take it no more. After one, the rest are free.
After one, the rest are free.
(R. 254: 9).
I've had it. It's injust, it's corrupt, and you know what? The legal system is
so injust and corrupt, that I'm going to take care of it by myself. That's all
there is to it.
(R. 254: 10).
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Only after I take a bunch of people with me. I'm not going to go by
myself. I can guarantee it.
(R. 254: 10).
And you know what? If 20 years ago, if 5 years ago, if 10 years ago
men would stand up and say, "You know what? I'm tired of being screwed
by Utah," and take action on their own, maybe somebody would say, "You
know what? Maybe this isn't right. We're getting Judges knocked off left
and right. Maybe this isn't right."
(R. 254: 11).
The only problem is, I don't care. If I can get four or five people in
Sanpete and Sevier County and they take me out, it's a better world, isn't it?

(R. 254: 12).
You know what? I told my buddy about it. I've got a pretty close
friend, and he told me - he said, "You know what you're not going to get
caught, but you're going to go to hell." It's worth it.
(R. 254: 13).
He's telling me I'm going to hell; but it's a damn good plan, so you know
what?
(R. 254: 14).
Go out with a bang.
(R. 254: 17).
14

Because the time they catch up with me, after one, the rest are free.
Yep, I'll make my mark.
(R.254: 17).
Well you know what? You know what? At the end of the day, the
people that are doing the same thing, they won't do it no more.
(R. 254: 19).
If I can get four or five and they catch me, so what? I'm still ahead.
(R.254: 21).
The day will come, and it won't be for awhile. The day will come
there will be justice, and the world will be a better place.
(R.254: 21).
But all that said, you know what? If I leave it alone, things are just
going to go on as usual. It's just going to keep happening to somebody else.
Judges refuse to follow the law, and attorney - yet. You know what? It's
got to end sometime.
(R. 254: 23-24).
There is no evidence to marshal in support of the element that Johnson bore the
requisite intent to influence any judge with the vituperative statements he made to his
lawyer, or that he expected any judge to learn of his statements. He did not instruct his
lawyer to convey any threats to the judges or to anyone else, and she did not indicate that
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such threats would be conveyed.
Jelte asked him what Judge Mower would have to do (apparently referring to what
the judge should do to be just), and Johnson replied that Mower would have to make up
for granting the protective order to his wife and permitting her to take everything but his
shaving equipment and his steel (R. 254: 15). Jelte asked what Judge Lyman would have
to do, Johnson indicated that if his wife's lawyer reimbursed him $150,000, then Lyman
and Johnson would be even (R. 254: 16). When Johnson indicated that he did not think
that would happen and Jelte confirmed that it would not, he reiterated that it would not
happen, and remarked "So there's just life, liberty and justice for all." (R. 254: 16). In
this conversation, Johnson merely answered his lawyer's vague questions apparently
asking him what the judges would have to do to be just in his opinion. Nothing in this
conversation is fairly read as an intimation that his lawyer should or would inform the
judges of any threats by Johnson.
When his lawyer asked him whom he had been discussing his plans with, he
declined to say, stating, "Nobody. Nobody else needs to be in this." (R. 254: 14). When
she asked details about what he was planning to do, he said he did not think he would tell
her, because it would not benefit her and would not benefit him if he told (R. 254: 15).
In sum, the conversation is properly viewed as a private conversation between
Johnson and his divorce lawyer concerning his profound anger and frustration with the
litigation of his divorce. While various of his statements are fairly read as threats to
16

assault or kill judges, there is no evidence that he intended his statements to reach or
influence any judge.
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL ANALYSIS WAS INCORRECT.
Judge Henriod's ruling on the motion to quash, that the elements of the offense as
defined by Fixel were for the jury to determine (R. 229), is legally incorrect in two ways.
First, district court judges have jurisdiction and are required to review bindover orders
from magistrates, to determine whether their jurisdiction, which is premised on a proper
bindover from a preliminary hearing, is sound. See, e.g.. State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d
464, 466 (Utah 1991). The matter cannot be left for a jury's determination, for our courts
generally hold that any deficiency in preliminary hearings is rendered moot by the full
panoply of procedural rights afforded to a criminal defendant in a jury trial. See kL at 467
n.6. Second, it is one of the most elementary duties of a trial court to define the elements
of crimes for juries in proper jury instructions. See, e.g.. State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35
(Utah 1980) (absence of accurate jury instruction on the elements of the offense
constitutes structural error).
This Court should reverse the trial court's order and require the bindover order
quashed. See Fixel, Virgin, supra.
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IL

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
DENYING JOHNSON'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PREVENT
JOHNSON'S ATTORNEY FROM TESTIFYING ABOUT THE
CONTENTS OF THEIR CONVERSATION REGARDING HIS
PENDING DIVORCE.

The trial court's denial of the motion in limine seeking to bar Joy Jelte from
testifying about her telephone conversation with Johnson was premised on the theory that
his statements against the trial judges in his divorce were not necessary to Jelte's
rendition of legal services, and thus were not covered by the attorney-client privilege (R.
224-227). Given that the ruling turns on the court's interpretation of the attorney-client
privilege, a brief overview of the relevant law is in order.
The attorney-client privilege "is intended to encourage candor between attorney
and client and promote the best possible representation of the client.'1 Gold Standard, Inc.
v. American Barrick Resources (USA). Inc.. 801 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1990). "It is the
oldest of the common law privileges protecting confidential communications." Doe v.
Maret, 984 P.2d 980 (Utah 1999). The privilege is contained in Utah Rule of Evidence
504 and is codified by Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(2), although the rule is generally read
as supplanting the statute. See, e.g., Spratley v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2003 UT
39, Tf 20 n.3, 78 P.3d 603. Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 provides clients with
parallel protection with regard to their lawyers' duty to maintain confidentiality,5 but the

5

The rule provides, in relevant part:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a
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ethical rules and the privilege are not coextensive, and thus, Rule 1.6, governing ethically
conduct of a lawyer, does not control the admissibility of the lawyer's testimony in court,
which is governed by Rule 504. Cf. Spratley v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2003 UT
39, ^ 14 n.2, 78 P.3d 603. See also, e ^ , Purcell v. District Attorney, 676 N.E.2d 436
(Mass. 1997); infra.
Utah Rule of Evidence 504 provides:

(b) General Rule of Privilege, A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose
and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential
communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of
professional legal services to the client between the client and the client's
representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and lawyers representing
others in matters of common interest, and among the client's
representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and lawyers representing
others in matters of common interest, in any combination.

client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is
permitted by paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(b)(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
Rule 1.6 did not permit Jelte to make the disclosures she did in this case because
Johnson stated that he would not return to Richfield before the next hearing but that he
would be present for that hearing. He also stated clearly at the end of the conversation
that nothing would happen in the near future. Under these circumstances, especially
where Johnson was located in New Mexico, any threatened harm was not reasonably
certain to occur and the disclosure was not permitted by Rule 1.6. Therefore, even if Rule
1.6 governed the admissibility and not just the disclosure of confidential statements, the
statements would be inadmissible nonetheless. Utah R. Prof. Cond. 1.6.
19

(c) Who May Claim the Privilege, The privilege may be claimed by the
client. ..
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(1) Furtherance of Crime or Fraud. If the services of the lawyer were
sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit
what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or
fraud[.]
This Court may confirm the inadmissibility of Jelte's testimony under the rule of
evidence by reviewing Purcell supra. In that case, a recently evicted tenant contacted an
attorney, Purcell, and indicated that he would burn down his former apartment building.
After much deliberation, the attorney informed the police and was later subpoenaed to
testify at trial. The Massachusetts Supreme Court examined rules substantially similar to
those in Utah and determined that the initial disclosure was not unethical. However,
"[t]he fact that the disciplinary code permitted Purcell to make the disclosure tells us
nothing about the admissibility of the information that Purcell disclosed." Purcell 676
N.E.2d at 438. The court ultimately held that, although ethically disclosed, the
communication was not admissible at trial. The court reasoned that while the harm the
client may have caused could be ameliorated by the lawyer's reporting the client's
criminal intentions, the policy interests behind the attorney-client privilege did not permit
the admission of the lawyer's testimony in court. The court recognized that if the
privilege were broadened to vitiate the privilege when the crime-fraud exception truly did
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not apply, lawyers might be less likely to report at all, in order to avoid adverse
consequences to their clients, or might be inclined to warn their clients that such
discussions may not be privileged, and thereby chill the clients' seeking of legal advice
and deprive the lawyers of the opportunities to inform their clients of the governing law
and to dissuade the clients from breaking it. Id. at 440-41.
Other courts, like the Purcell court, recognize that the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege does not apply merely because a lawyer learns of a crime or fraud
during the course of representation, but instead requires proof that the client was actually
seeking the lawyer's aid in committing an offense. See, e.g.. In re Richard Roe, Inc., 68
F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir.1995) ("the crime-fraud exception does not apply simply because
privileged communications would provide an adversary with evidence of a crime or
fraud[;]n to invoke exception, there must be proof that legal communications were in
furtherance of crime).
In the instant case, the substance of the conversation and recording are not
admissible under Rule 504 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. There is nothing in the
Johnson-Jelte conversation intimating that Johnson was seeking Jelte's assistance in
committing any crime, and thus the crime-fraud exception does not apply. See,
e.g., Purcell, supra. The Advisory Committee Notes following Rule 504 state, "The
client is entitled not only to refuse to disclose the confidential communication, but also to
prevent disclosure by the lawyer or others who were involved in the conference or
21

learned, without the knowledge of the client, the content of the confidential
communication." Here, the State learned of the confidential information "without the
knowledge of the client." Therefore, where none of the exceptions to the rule are
applicable, Johnson is entitled to prevent the privileged information from being disclosed
to the jury. See id.
Johnson's statements were made in the course of a telephone conversation between
him and his divorce lawyer concerning the pending divorce. In the course of this
discussion, his lawyer was giving him legal advice concerning legitimate details in his
divorce, the potential ramifications of his actions, and the advisability of attending court
and letting the process address his concerns (R. 254 at 2-24). The telephone conversation
was initiated by the lawyer, ostensibly to discuss the pending divorce, but truthfully to set
up the client to make inflammatory statements on tape (R. 253: 16-18). If this Court
were to condone the trial court's ruling, parsing out statements threatening judges
involved in the divorce at issue from the remainder of the legal conversation, this would
undoubtedly undermine the policy interest to be served by the privilege - to encourage
those seeking legal advice to provide all relevant information to their lawyers in order to
obtain the best possible representation and comply with the law. See, e ^ , Gold
Standard. Inc. v. American Barrick Resources (USA), Inc., 801 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah
1990), supra.
In denying the motion in limine, the trial court chose to rely on Aviles v. State, 165
22

S.W.3d 437 (Tex. App. 2005), a case which is readily distinguished, because there, the
client was not even speaking with his lawyer, but was listening to a court interpreter's
summary of what the lawyer wanted the client to know and then informed the interpreter
outside the hearing of his lawyer that when he got out, he was going to kill the prosecutor,
The court understandably held that this threat was not made in an effort to obtain legal
advice. Id. at 438-39.
The other case Judge Henriod relied on in denying the motion in limine, Hodgson
Russ, LLP v. Trube, 867 So.2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), is similarly distinguished
by the facts upon which the court's holding turned. There, the court held that a brother's
statement to his lawyer that he would kill his sister to end the dispute over their mother's
estate was not privileged as necessary to obtaining informed legal advice, because the
statement was made at the end of a legal conference, as he was walking out of the office.
Id. at 1247.
In contrast, Johnson's statements at issue here were made intermittently in the
course of a protracted discussion of his protracted divorce. The conversation here was
initiated by the attorney, who wished to lead Johnson to repeat statements he had made in
an earlier conversation so she could record them (R. 253: 16-18). She began the
conversation by inquiring about the client's checklist, and he responded by inquiring
about the protective order, his alimony, and his 40IK (R. 254: 2-4). They discussed his
child support and visitation, the property division, the protective order, whether he would
23

exercise his right to appeal, whether he could afford to pay attorney fees for an appeal,
potential for reconciliation with his wife, the proper attorney's fees for her lawyer,
whether the lawyers and judges in his case were following the law, whether there was
perjury, ex parte contact with a judge or unethical conduct involved in his case, how
justice should be administered, and what the potential consequences were to him if he
hurt someone (R. 254: 4-23). While he did repeatedly and heatedly express frustration
with the judges, two lawyers, and the functioning of the judicial system, his most
imminent threat was to come to court in a T-shirt and Levis (R. 254: 23). When Jelte told
him to leave his guns home, he told her that he and his crew dealt with matters of life and
death every day and he was not stupid (R. 254: 23). The conversation ended with him
remarking that he did not have anything planned in the near future (R: 254: 24).
On these facts, it is fairly concluded that Johnson's participation in this
conversation with his lawyer about his pending divorce and the upcoming hearing was
"for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services" to himself.
Accordingly, it is privileged under Utah Rule of Evidence 504. See Purcell supra.
Compare Aviles and Hodson Russ, supra.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's orders denying the motion to quash the
bindover order and denying the motion in limine.
Respectfully submitted this S
U
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f

2006.
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TRIAL COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION
DENYING MOTION IN LIMINE

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

Case No. 051909162

v.

:

Judge Stephen L. Henriod

JEFFERY K. JOHNSON,

:

Date: June 14, 2 0 06

Defendant.

:

Plaintiff,

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion in Limine.
Having considered the memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court
enters the following decision and finds that Defendant's Motion should
be DENIED,
At issue here is whether an attorney is allowed to testify against
a former client regarding threats the client allegedly made against a
number of judges and conveyed to his attorney. Defendant concedes that
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(l)1 allowed his attorney to
report Defendant's alleged statement to law enforcement authorities in
order to prevent Defendant from acting on the threats.
However,
Defendant argues that his alleged statements are still privileged and so
his attorney cannot testify regarding them in Defendant's criminal
prosecution. The State disagrees and argues that Defendant's statements
were not privileged and, therefore, his attorney is allowed to disclose
the statements during these criminal proceedings.
The Court recognizes that this issue is one of first impression
here in Utah. Additionally, there appears to be a split among the other
limited jurisdictions that have addressed this issue. Therefore, the
Court does not undertake this decision lightly.
However, the Court
finds that Defendant's statements were not privileged and Defendant's
former attorney may testify against Defendant at his trial.
It is clear that only " [c] onf idential disclosures by a client to an
attorney made in order to obtain legal assistance are privileged. The
purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure
to their attorneys [in order to obtain fully informed legal advice.]"
Fisher
v. U.S.,
425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (internal citations omitted).

Rule 1.6(b)( 1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
(b)
A lawyers may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(l)(b) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.
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achieve its purpose. Accordingly it protects only those disclosures necessary to obtain informed legal advice - which might not have been
made absent the privilege."
Id.
Courts seem to have split on how to apply the attorney-client
privilege in circumstances such as these, where a client allegedly makes
threats regarding other individuals to his/her attorney.
The Court,
however, is persuaded by Aviles
v. State, 165 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Ct. App.
2005) and Hodgson Russ,
LLP v. Trube,
867 So.2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004).
In Aviles,
the court held that when client conveyed a threat to an
interpreter, who conveyed the threat to the client's attorney, that
-communication was not privileged because it "was not made for the
rendition of professional legal services and [was] therefore not covered
by the attorney-client privilege." 165 S.W.2d at 439. Defendant argues
that this case is distinguishable because the threat was made to an
interpreter and not to the attorney.
However, Aviles
does seem
applicable because the court found that it was not determinative whether
the interpreter was a representative of the attorney because the
information could not be privileged. Id.
The court stated "Appellant's
communication of a threat to kill his court-appointed interpreter can in
no way be considered necessary to the rendition of legal services for
his pending burglary trial.
We hold that this communication of an
intent to commit a crime is not covered by the attorney-client
privilege, rendering irrelevant the role the interpreter may have been
serving at the time of the communication."
Id.
Similarly, in Hodgson Russ, the court found that it was proper to
admit an attorney's testimony against his client because "the threat
[made by the client] was extraneous and was not a communication incident
or necessary to obtaining legal advice." 867 So.2d at 1248.
Defendant relies primarily on Purcell
v. District
Attorney,
676
N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997). In Purcell,
Mr. Tyree had gone to an attorney,
Mr. Purcell, to discuss an employment matter.
During the course of
those discussions, Tyree made threats to burn down the apartment
building where he had been employed. Id. at 437-38. Purcell considered
these threats credible and reported them to the police.
Id. at 438.
After Tyree was indicted for attempted arson, the district attorney
subpoenaed Purcell to testify. Purcell moved to quash the subpoena and
that issue went up on appeal.
Id.
On appeal, the court found that
there was no question regarding the ethical propriety of Purcell's
disclosure of the threats to the police but that there was an issue
regarding whether Purcell could testify at Tyree's arson trial. The
court stated that the "attorney-client privilege applies only when the
client's communication was for the purpose of facilitating the rendition
of legal services. . . . A statement of an intention to commit a crime

STATE V. JOHNSON

PAGE 3

MEMORANDUM DECISION

made in the course of seeking legal advice is protected by the
privilege, unless the crime-fraud exception applies.
That exception
applies only if the client or prospective client seeks advice or
assistance in furtherance of criminal conduct." Id. at 115. The court
went on to find that Tyree's communication to Purcell was privileged,
saying, "Unless the crime-fraud exception applies, the attorney-client
privilege should apply to communications concerning possible future, as
well as past, criminal conduct, because an informed lawyer may be able
to dissuade the client from improper future conduct and, if not, under
the ethical rules may elect in the public interest to make a limited
disclosure of the client's threatened conduct." Id. at 116.
Defendant also relies on Kleinfeld
v. State,
568 So.2d 937 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990), which held that it was error to require an
attorney to testify about his client's statement: "They [the police]
know I did [murdered] Eric. I've got nothing to lose by doing you and
then turning the gun on myself" because the statement was privileged.
Id. at 939-40. However, Kleinfeld
was later distinguished in Florida by
Hodgson Russ,
which stated that Kleinfeld
applied only to cases where
a privileged communication was admitted to prove an admission to a
previous crime.
867 So. 2d at 1248.
It did not apply when the
attorney's testimony would be admitted to prove that the client intended
to commit a future murder.
Id.
The Court finds Aviles
and Hodgson
Russ more persuasive than
Purcell
for a number of reasons. First, Aviles
seems more in line with
Utah's current recognition of attorney-client privilege. Specifically,
in Jackson
v. Kennecott
Copper Corp., 27 Utah 2d 310, 315, 495 P. 2d 1254
(1972), the court, citing to U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery,
89 F.Supp.
357 (D. Mass. 1950), said that a party asserting -privilege has the
burden of showing that the communication between attorney and client was
"for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding."
Additionally, Utah Rule of Evidence 504(a)(6) provides: "A communication
is 'confidential' if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other
than those to whom the disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of
professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary
for the transmission of the communication." Subsection (b) of Rule 504
goes on to say: U A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal
services
to the client between the client
and the
client's
representatives, lawyers . . . ." It is clear that Utah holds that not
everything a person says to his attorney is necessarily privileged. A
person can make statements to his attorney which are not privileged
because they are not made for the purpose of facilitating legal
services. In the present case, Defendant did not make the threats to
his attorney for the "purpose of facilitating the rendition of
professional legal services." He did not seek legal advice, an opinion
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regarding his potential actions, etc.2 While Defendant was represented
by counsel when he made the alleged threats, his threats did not at all
relate to counsel's representation of him. Therefore, the statements
seem to fall under Jackson,
et. al., which would exclude them from
privilege.
Second, Aviles/Hodgson
Russ are the most recent efforts of courts
to resolve this issue and seem to represent a growing trend in'favor of
finding threats unprotected by attorney/client privilege.
Finally, Aviles/Hodgson
represent a more compelling policy interest
than Purcell.
Purcell
argues that, in order to protect the
attorney/client privilege, all statements made to attorneys must be
afforded protections that they would not ordinarily be afforded.
Aviles/Hodgson
recognize
that attorney/client
privilege
can be
adequately protected by affording maximum protection to statements that
are made in the context of the attorney/client relations, i.e.,
statements that are made to facilitate legal services.
However,
statements that are not made to facilitate legal services are not
properly protected under attorney/client privilege. This services the
interest of the attorney/client privilege while still supporting other
important policy considerations such as facilitating prosecution of
criminal behavior.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion
in Limine should be DENIED because the attorney-client privilege does
not bar Ms. Jelte from testifying at Def endSn't'^^irial.

2

Strangely, if Defendant had sought legal advice in order to further his alleged intended crimes, his statements
would not be privileged according to Purcell. This could lead to the odd result diat statements made in furtherance of
receiving advice would not be protected, while statements not made in furtherance of receiving advice would be
protected.
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TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN JEFFERY JOHNSON AND
JOY JELTE
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on unknown date)

3

(Phone number dialed and ringing)

4

MR. JOHNSON:

5

MS. JELTE:

6

MR. JOHNSON:

7

MS. JELTE:

Hello?
Hi.

Jeff, this is Joy Jelte.

I didn't

How are you?
I almost expected to get your answering

8

machine.

9

for the hearing on Monday, but I don't have your checklist.

10
11

I just got the transcript from the court reporter

MR. JOHNSON:

I really just don't have a fax —

the only

questions I have is how come the Judge never addressed Neeley

13

about the protective order.

14

MS. JELTE:

16

Yeah.

It's not addressed in it.
I think the way he addressed it was

by dismissing it.
MR. JOHNSON:

And the only other thing is do I have to

17

pay back alimony when she's still drawing from my 4 01-K?

18

ought to be the same, because my 401-K stops back in March.

19

MS. JELTE:

20

MR. JOHNSON:

21

MS. JELTE:

23

MR. JOHNSON:

25

It all

Uh-huh.
Or else my alimony should start from the

day the decree is signed.

22

24

I

thought you were going to fax something to me.'

12

15

—

Okay, wait.

Say it again.

She's still taking that —

get money out of my 401-K; it's $500 a month.
MS. JELTE:

Uh-huh.

she'll still

-41

MR. JOHNSON:

That should go back to March.

She'll be

2

able to quit then, and I'll owe back alimony or else —

3

whatever, start paying alimony from the time the decree is

4

signed.

5

MS. JELTE:

Oh, okay.

I apologize.

yeah,

I haven't looked

6

at your file, and so I'm not real up to speed on what the issues

7

are.

8

looking at the transcript and then going to the objection and

9

then looking back at the other notes and so on.

I plan on doing that over the weekend, starting with first

So I'm going to

10

have to get up to speed on it before I do anything else.

11

going to be going to Richfield?

12

MR. JOHNSON:

13

MS. JELTE:

14

MR. JOHNSON:

15

MS. JELTE:

Are you

For the Court date?
Uh-huh.
Yeah.
Okay, because between now and then we'll

16

probably need to talk probably once —

17

issues are and what position you want to take and so on.

18

but I probably won't give you a call back until Sunday when I get

19

into it a little bit more.

20

MR. JOHNSON:

21

MS. JELTE:

22

once more about what the
So

Okay.
I'm not going to spend that much time with

it tonight other than to maybe glance at the transcript.

23

MR. JOHNSON:

24

MS. JELTE:

25

MR. JOHNSON:

—

Okay.
I hope you're feeling better.
It's just the same.

It doesn't ever

~5~
1

change.

2

MS. JELTE:

Well, you get to see Caden.

3

MR. JOHNSON:

4

MS. JELTE:

5

MR. JOHNSON:

6

MS. JELTE:

7

MR. JOHNSON:

That's good.

Yeah, but do I want to see Caden?
Sure, you do.
I'm pretty much writing him off.
Why is that?
It's not worth it.

It's not worth it

8

every time I want to see him to have to go to Court or deal with

9

attorneys to see him.

10

MS. JELTE:

When was the last time you saw him?

11

MR. JOHNSON:

July, 1st of July.

So if she wants me

12

miserable that's fine, but Caden -- yeah, he'll get his child

13

support, but he's not getting any inheritance and he's not

14

getting a dad.

15

this whole situation.

That's that.

I've had it.

I'm totally out of

16

MS. JELTE:

17

to handle your son.

18

you're a better dad than that.

19

think it will pass and I think you'll get on with your life and

20

things will get better.

21

Well, I don't think that that's the best way
He cares about you a lot, and I think that

MR. JOHNSON:

I know you're frustrated, but I

But one thing about it, when he gets older

22

he can ask questions why, and I'll tell him then, but I —

23

know, I'm not —

24
25

I've had it.

MS. JELTE:
him lately?

you

What about your other son?

Have you seen

-6MR. JOHNSON:

Oh, I talk to him quite often.

So yep, I

think the Court system in Utah is screwed up.
MS. JELTE:
will —

I know you feel that way right now, but it

I think -MR. JOHNSON:

feel it's right.

You can't tell me in 20 years I'm going to

I lost $200,000 and she made a profit.

You

can't tell me I'll think better about it in 20 years.
MS. JELTE:

No, I was saying you'd think —

I think you

need to wait and let us get through the emotions and everything.
I think right now you're
MR. JOHNSON:

—

The Judge hasn't ruled in on one thing to

help me not one time, not either Judge.

So no, I'm never going

to come around.
MS. JELTE:
and

Well, I think Mower tries to do a good job,

—
MR. JOHNSON:

He's a slime ball.

He's a liar and he's

unethical, and he's going to have what's coming to him.
MS. JELTE:

I think

MR. JOHNSON:
hypocrite.

—

All of the Mowers —

He doesn't follow the law.

yeah, he's a

He's the Judge.

He

doesn't follow the law.
MS. JELTE:

I think that when you —

you need to reserve

judgment until we get through this next hearing.
MR. JOHNSON:
to change.

Well, we'll see, but I'm —

I think Lyman is a piece of shit.

it's not going
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MS. JELTE:

I know it would have helped if he had heard

2

your motion about the debts before you finally couldn't take it

3

anymore and filed bankruptcy.

4

I —

I know that would have helped, but

that Judge, too, Lyman, I think, tries to

5

MR. JOHNSON:

—

How can the Judge sit there and think,

6

okay, you have a hundred and some thousand dollars income, and

7

you take half the income away and give the guy all the bills and

8

have him pay it all and think, well, it's going to be rosy, and

9

that go a year?

10

You know what?

11

any time?

12
13

Oh, but give her all the assets in the meantime.
Fair and equitable, did that come into play at

I don't think so.
MS. JELTE:

and that

Well, you still have the right to appeal,

—

14

MR. JOHNSON:

15

MS. JELTE:

16

MR. JOHNSON:

17

MS. JELTE:

18

No.

Yeah, but what good is that going to do?
That's

—

Really.
—

It's in Utah.

20 days from the date that the decree is

finally signed.

19

MR. JOHNSON:

I think, you know what, the better way

20

I have no faith in the Court system.

21

all.

22

it fair.

I have no faith in it at

The only way it's ever going to be fair is when people make

23

MS. JELTE:

24

MR. JOHNSON:

25

—

else is playing by.

Well

—

They go by the same principles everybody
Does Neeley play by the rules?

No.

Does
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the Court system play by the rules?

2

Do they follow the law?

3

signing —

4

He's not following the law on judgments he's making.

5

following the law.

So how can he expect people to follow the

6

law if he refuses?

It's not going to happen.

7

Is the Court system fair?

No, they don't.

You've got Lyman

I'm not even represented, and he's signing bills.

MS. JELTE:

He's not

Well, I think if you go back to that first

8

hearing, I think you've forgotten about what she was testifying

9

to about how she thought that the bills were generated because

10

from debt that you had acquired and that had been rolled over.

11

That's where Lyman was coming from.

12

MR. JOHNSON:

And so it's safe to say that the Court

13

thinks that she should live in a house rent free, be able to

14

pocket all the cash she wants and live rent free, free of any

15

obligations for two years and be fine.

16

She wasn't paying for the house.

17

MS. JELTE:

18

MR. JOHNSON:

19

MS. JELTE:

She has no obligation.

The Court system is screwed.

I think Judge Lyman

—

He's an asshole.
Well, I think one of the reasons he got off

20

the case had to do with concerns about that ex parte protective

21

order and having Judge Mower hear it to have somebody fresh and

22

anew to try to resolve the case.

23

he missed some points, and that's what the hearing on Monday is

24

about, is to try to get him to try to close up those holes in

25

your case and get that resolved.

I think Mower tried.

I think

—

-91
2

MR. JOHNSON:
change.

3

But the end judgment is not going to

I'm still screwed.
MS. JELTE:

I think if you can just —

4

this hearing.

5

feel a lot better and things will

I think you'll feel better, and I think you'll

6

MR. JOHNSON:

7 I

MS. JELTE:

8

let's get through

Well

—

—

If you just give it some time and distance.

Then if you want to pursue your appeal, fine, but

9

MR. JOHNSON:

—

Maybe I'll appeal it, maybe I won't, but

10

I don't have any faith in the legal system.

11

myself, because you know what? Yeah, there's too much corruption.

12

I've seen all —

13

County, and you know what?

14

After one, the rest are free.

15

MS. JELTE:

16

MR. JOHNSON:

17

MS. JELTE:

18

MR. JOHNSON:

19

could

I can handle it by

I've seen firsthand the corruption in Sevier
I'm not going to take it no more.

I'm sorry, what did you say?
After one, the rest are free.
Oh.
I've had it.

This has went as bad as it

—

20

(Tape cuts out and then starts again)

21

MS. JELTE:

22

MR. JOHNSON:

But your parents

—

And they can put me in jail.

They can put me in jail for 60 days.

You know

23

what?

They can put me in

24

jail for a year, and all it's going to do is piss me off more.

25

They can take away my guns, and all it's going to do is piss me

-10off more.
what?

I've had it.

It's injust, it's corrupt, and you know

The legal system is so injust and corrupt, that I'm going

to take care of it by myself.
MS. JELTE:

That's all there is to it.

I think you need to be thinking about both

of your children, and I think
MR. JOHNSON:

—

I'm not —

both of my children anymore.

I was a damn good dad, but this

stage in the game, you know what?
you know what?

That's not even —

I don't

—

It doesn't even matter.

MS. JELTE:

Jeff, are you suicidal right now?

MR. JOHNSON:
with me.

I don't even plan on seeing

Only after I take out a bunch of people

I'm not going to go by myself.
MS. JELTE:

I can guarantee it.

Well, you've got two really wonderful

parents who love you dearly.
MR. JOHNSON:
MS. JELTE:

And that's not the problem.

No.

MR. JOHNSON:

The problem is the damn system.

problem is, she makes a profit and I go bust.

The

The problem is

my first attorney before I talked to you said, "Lyman has already
judged on you because of the shit that Dale Eyre told him."
know what?

You

Dale Eyre and the Judge are not even supposed to talk

about me.
MS. JELTE:

You've got two beautiful children.

MR. JOHNSON:
MS. JELTE:

And I wrote them both off.

And you've got two wonderful parents, and
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you need to think about how your decisions will affect those

2

people.

3

MR. JOHNSON:

And you know what?

If 20 years ago, if 5

4

years ago, if 10 years ago men would stand up and say, "You know

5

what?

6

their own, maybe somebody would say, "You know what?

7

isn't right.

8

Maybe this isn't right."

9
10

I'm tired of being screwed by Utah," and take action on

We're getting Judges knocked off left and right.

MS. JELTE:
and working

11

Maybe this

It's called working with your Legislature

—

MR. JOHNSON:

No, the law is just.

When the Legislature

12

says "fair and equitable," when they write a protective order

13

and said if the person is attacked and they attack back in self-

14

defense, if they do something in self-defense then it shouldn't

15

be held to a protective order.

16

who says, "Oh, yeah, it's fine for somebody to attack in self-

17

defense, and if you respond back then it's malicious," he's not

18

following the Legislature.

19

anywhere in my case is fair and equitable.

20

MS. JELTE:

21

MR. JOHNSON:

Then you look at Judge Lyman

Fair and equitable, I don't think

That's when you take it up on appeal.
No, that's —

by —

you know what?

So I

22

can spend 40 more thousand dollars and get it stuck up my ass

23

again.

24
25

No.
MS. JELTE:

from —

if you

—

The problem is is that what —

if you

—

-12MR. JOHNSON:

The only problem is, I don't care.

If I

can get four or five people in Sanpete and Sevier County and they
take me out, it's a better world, isn't it?
MS. JELTE:

No, hon, that's

MR. JOHNSON:

—

And if I can take out their DNA offspring,

it's even better.
MS. JELTE:

Hon, that's not the way you solve the

problem.
MR. JOHNSON:
MS. JELTE:

It is at this point.
No, because then all you're going to do is

break your parents' heart and devastate your children, and your
children will be —
face.

have this legacy that is horrible for them to

You're too good a man for that.
MR. JOHNSON:

upset.

You're upset right now.

No, I've been upset for years.

I'm past

I want justice.
MS. JELTE:

Jeff, ever since I've met you you've been a

real concerned dad about your children and what you wanted for
them.
MR. JOHNSON:

It's past that.

It's past that.

State of Utah doesn't give a shit about my kids.
know what?

The —

The
you

Judge Lyman didn't give a fuck if I starved Jordan

to death when I had him.
MS. JELTE:

He didn't care about kids.

You would break your parents' heart and your

children, and you know that.
MR. JOHNSON:

But if the world's a better place after I
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leave, you know what?

2

MS. JELTE:

That's all that matters, right?
I don't know what you're planning, hon, but

3

I just —

I want you not to do whatever it is you're thinking

4

about, and I'm serious.

5

MR. JOHNSON:

You know what?

I told my buddy about it.

6

I've got a pretty close friend, and he told me —

7

know what, you're not going to get caught, but you're going to go

8

to hell."

9

he said, "You

It's worth it.
MS. JELTE:

I wish your friend had told you to —

10

to do whatever it is you're talking about doing.

11

sound like much of a friend to me.

12

MR. JOHNSON:

13

make the world a better place.

14

MS. JELTE:

15

MR. JOHNSON:

It's just you know what?

not

It doesn't

You've got the

That's not making the world a better place.
Of course it is.

You know what?

Once

16

a Judge gets on the bench, they're held —

17

accountability.

18

you can screw somebody, and work outside the law and sit up there

19

and lie, you know what?

You know what?

they don't have any

If being an attorney is how bad

There's no accountability there.

20

(Tape cuts out and then starts again)

21

MR. JOHNSON:.

22

MS. JELTE:

23

MR. JOHNSON:

24

MS. JELTE:

25

be stupid?

Guess what?

Who's your friend that

—

I'm that somebody.
Who's your friend that's encouraging you to
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MR. JOHNSON:

No, he's not encouraging me.

He's telling

2

me I'm going to hell; but it's a damn good plan, so you know

3

what?

4

MS. JELTE:

5

MR. JOHNSON:

6

Neeley is an asshole.

7

have took the steps that he took, I'm sure me and the ex could

8

have got back together.

9

Who are you talking about?

MS. JELTE:

Nobody.

Nobody else needs to be in this.

You know what?

To this day if he wouldn't

I don't know that Corrinne

10

MR. JOHNSON:

11

MS. JELTE:

You know what, me

—

—

I don't know that Corrinne was asking him

12

for advice on whether to reconcile.

13

shocked that you guys were trying to reconcile.

I think he was pretty

14

MR. JOHNSON:

15

I know he distorted the facts.

16

he's had multiple affairs.

17

If he's going to screw me for everything he can, for money,

18

legal or not, you know, he'll do whatever he can, then he should

19

anticipate me screwing him for every way I can, legal or not.

20

he has no ethics, he shouldn't expect people he's screwing to

21

have ethics.

MS. JELTE:

23

MR. JOHNSON:

25

I don't really care.

I know he's an asshole.

So you know what?

I know

He's an asshole.

If

You know, that's the bottom line.

22

24

Well, you know what?

So

—

He took away my kids.

I'll take away his

kids.
MS. JELTE:

So what are you planning on doing, kiddo?
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2

MR. JOHNSON:

I don't think I'll tell you, you know.

It

won't benefit you, and I know it won't benefit me if I tell you.

3

MS. JELTE:

Well, I know one thing.

You —

I don't

—

4

it doesn't matter what you're talking about doing or what you're

5

thinking about doing.

6

to —

7

talk to them about how angry and upset you are

8

if you need to sit down with a counselor or somebody and

MR. JOHNSON:

9

I don't think so.

10

I don't think so.

11
12
13

You need to just not do it, and you need

—

Is that going to give me my $300,000 back?

Is that going to make Neeley a better person?

MS. JELTE:

But who cares about how Neeley is or who he

is or what he does in the future?
MR. JOHNSON:

It's called justice. Why should I continue

14

to sit idly by and let him fuck people over, to let him do it to

15

somebody else.

16

it's the game; but with people involved it's not.

I know with you it's —

17

MS. JELTE:

18

MR. JOHNSON:

19

you know, it's the job,

I don't think that
Okay.

—

If Neeley writes me a check for

$150,000, I'll call it even with him.

20

MS. JELTE:

21

MR. JOHNSON:

And what does the Judge have to do?
Well, if he ~

let's see, the Judge.

I

22

think Sevier County Judge Mower, he's the one that signed the

23

protective order for her to go remove everything except for my

24

personal shaving articles, and steel.

25

So I think he can make up for that.

He won't give them back.
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MS

JELTE:

2

MR

JOHNSON :

3

And what about Judge Lyman?
I don't know

If Neeley gives me\ the 150

grand. I guess we'll be even, won't we?

4

MS. JELTE:

5

MR. JOHNSON :

6

MS. JELTE:

No, it's not going to happen.

7

MR. JOHNSON

It's not going to happen.

Well, Jeff

—

But I don't see that happening.

So there's just

life, liberty and justice for all.
You said the other day something that really

MS. JELTE:

10

scared me, Jeff.

11

would end.

12

involve ending anybody's life.

13

MR. JOHNSON:

You said that you —

that Doug Neeley' s life

Now, I don't know what ]/ou're planning, but it can't
You know that.

So when you <jo into Court and VOLi take

14

everybody's everything, and you lie to do it, you know, I don't

15

know.

16

do anything to get to those ends.

He doesn't care what happens to my life.

17

MS. JELTE:

18

MR. JOHNSON:

19
20

I —

remember he's

He'll 1 ie, he'll

—

I'm tired of being fucked with.

I'm tired

of it.
MS. JELTE:

I think you're just —

I think you' re just

21

upset right now, and I think that —- I'm going to check on you

22

tomorrow or —

23

MR. JOHNSON:

24

MS. JELTE:

25

MR. JOHNSON:

Joy
—

—

either tomorrow or the next day.
Joy, I'm not suicidal.

1
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MS. JELTE:

2

MR. JOHNSON

3

suicide.

I am not suicidal.

Justice.

It's not

It 's justice.

4

MS. JELTE:

5

MR. JOHNSON.

6

Pardon me?

I really am worried about you.
Well, you know what, maybe people ought to

follow the 1<aw.

7

MS. JELTE:

I'd like to see you --

MR. JOHNSON:

You know, in the whole Court situation

maybe the Judge ought to consider, "Maybe I should follow the

10

law."

11

MS. JELTE: . And so what are you

12

MR. JOHNSON:

13

MS. JELTE:

14

MR. JOHNSON:

15

MS. JELTE:

16

MR. JOHNSON:

17

That's not going to happen.
—

going to do?
Go out with a bang.

No, you're not going to do that.
No.

No, actually, I plan on —

Look

—

just

justice, Joy

18

MS. JELTE:

19

MR. JOHNSON:

20

after one, the rest are free.

21

—

MS. JELTE:

Look

—

Because the time they catch up with me,
Yep, I'll make my mark.

No, hon, you're not going to do that.

22

You're going to —

23

you're going to go tcilk to somebody about it, and you're going to

24

go and see if you carL just get clear headed so that you don't do

25

something stupid.

you're just going to take a deep breath, and
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MS. JELTE:

Well, then go.

MR. JOHNSON:
back.

I have counseling for free, Joy.

You know what?

Why?

They're not going to get my money

I know what's right.

I know what's just.

It just seems like everybody else has no idea.
MS. JELTE:
if you —

I know that whatever -- if you —

you know,

the other day you were talking about hurting Doug and

you were talking about hurting the Judge, and you were talking
about hurting —

taking away property and family and so on.

is -- all you're talking about is destruction.
justice?

That

So how is that

It's not.
MR. JOHNSON:

Okay.

When somebody takes away all my

property, my family, everything I've worked for, $200,000,
totally destroying me, what are they talking about?
MS. JELTE:

Well

MR. JOHNSON:
MS. JELTE:

—

And they don't follow the law to do it.
You haven't pursued every avenue of appeal.

MR. JOHNSON:

Joy, how many hundreds of thousands of

dollars can I afford in attorney fee —
gain back.

I'll never gain back.

fees, which I'll never

For what?

How many hundreds

of thousand dollars is it worth living my life hell to get back
justice which they'll never pay the price for.
accountability on the other side.
MS. JELTE:

There is no

There's not.

And so you do something destructive, and you

ruin your life and you ruin your kids' lives and you ruin your
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parents' lives and

2

—

MR. JOHNSON:

Well, you know what?

You know what?

3

the end of the day, the people that are doing the same thing,

4

they won't do it no more.

5

MS. JELTE:

6

MR. JOHNSON:

7

MS. JELTE:

8 I

MR. JOHNSON:

9

The only

This isn't something I just conjured up.
I

10

New Mexico.

11

What's right is right.

13

—

—
I mean, I've been thinking about this

since I've been living in Utah.

12

I mean, it was good to move to

I'm damn glad I did, but it's just —

MS. JELTE:

At

Your —

you know what?

Jeff, as far as I can tell, none of

us have the moral right to pass judgment on another human being.

14

MR. JOHNSON:

15

MS. JELTE:

But they have, haven't they?
You can get on with your life.

If you do

16

something that ends the life of another person, you disrupt so

17

much, not just your life, but their life and the people that love

18

them

—

19

MR. JOHNSON:

20

MS. JELTE:

21
22

Boy, I'd hate to disrupt their life.
—

and the people that love you and are

concerned about you and care about you.
MR. JOHNSON:

And I'm sure that all that consideration

23

went into the judgments and into Court, didn't it?

They was

24

really concerned about how bad they destroyed me, wasn't.they?

25

I'm sure it just tore them up.
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MS. JELTE:

2

You don't think your parents aren't

concerned?

3

MR. JOHNSON :

It has nothing to do with my parents.

4

don'Jb think my parents made judgments.

5

got iip on the stand and lied, deceived, twisted stories to —

6 1 know .
7

I don't think my parents

It heis nothing to do with my parents.

Neel<By,

MS. JELTE:

9

MR. JOHNSON :

It has to do with

Well, Dale Eyre hasn't been involved in --

10

MS. JELTE:

11

MR. JOHNSON :

12

MS. JELTE:

13

he's been involved?

Yes, he has.

—

your case in the last

—

Yes, he has.

—

MR. JOHNSON :

two years.

What makes you think that

Because Dale Eyre was talking to Judge

15

Lyman, and the first attorney that was related to Judge Mclff

16

told me that

17

MS. JELTE:

18

want you to just

19

Oh.

Hon, I'm worried about you.

I just

—

MR. JOHNSON

There's no need to worry, Joy.

20

made up.

21

down here.

I have fun all the time, you know.

22

know what?

There will be justice.

I'm not suicidal.

23

MS. JELTE:

24

MR. JOHNSON:

25

MS. JELTE:

I

you

two Judges, and Dale Eyre.

8

14

I

I'm not.

My mind is

I have a really good life

Yeah, there will be justice

1

It's just you

—

There will.
—

you'll get caught.

1
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2

MR. JOHNSON:

Well, you know what?

five and they catch me, so what?

3

MS. JELTE:

4

MR. JOHNSON:

5

MS. JELTE:

Yeah, I am.
No.

to a counselor, okay?

7

MR. JOHNSON:
$200,000.

9

screwed from me.

Hon, look, I want you to just go talk

No.

They're not going to give me back

Neeley is not going to give me back the money he
The Judge sure as hell is not going to give

10

me any money back.

11

awhile.

12

will be a better place.

13

I'm still ahead.

No, you're not ahead.

6

8

If I can get four or

No.

The day will come, and it won't be for

The day will come there will be justice, and the world

MS. JELTE:

Well, as your attorney and your friend,

14

I'm not going to give up on you.

We're going to be talking about

15

this hearing coming up Monday.

16

and checking with you this weekend, because I just think you're

17

just down right now.

18

think

I'm going to be talking with you

It may not feel like you're down, but I

—

19

MR. JOHNSON:

20

MS. JELTE:

21

MR. JOHNSON:

22

MS. JELTE:

23

MR. JOHNSON:

I've been down
—

—

you're just depressed.
—

for three years.

Well, what

—

I'm not depressed, Joy.

I mean, after I

24

get off the phone with you, it's Friday night, I'll go out and

25

have fun.

I've got things set up for tonight.

I mean, I have a
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1

good life.

2

MS. JELTE:

3

MR. JOHNSON

4

MS. JELTE:

5

MR. JOHNSON

6

Why?
Because -There's no justice.

MS. JELTE:

8

MR. JOHNSON

9

MS. JELTE:

Because

But you're not —

no —

you're not the

person who s hould go around administering justice.
MR. JOHNSON:

12

MS. JELTE:

13

MR. JOHNSON:

Then who is that

—

I'm not the person -Who is that person?

14

can't follow the law"'

15

assigning justice?

16

MS. JELTE:

17

MR. JOHNSON:

18

MS. JELTE:

20

—

There's none in Utah.

11

19

There still has to be

justice.

7

10

Well, then don't blow it.

Is it Judges that

Is that the person that's supposed to be

Yeah, but you're talking

—

Judges that refuse to follow the law?
You're talking about taking action to hurt

somebody else.
MR. JOHNSON:

21

hurt me; yes or no?

22

MS. JELTE:

Did somebody take action against me to

We don't live out in a —

we may live out

23

in the west, but we don't act like it.

24

don't kill people, we don't harm property, and you know that.

25

MR. JOHNSON:

We don't carry guns, we

You'd be surprised what people can live

j
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through and survive.

3

about anythi ng and survive, and so can you.
MR. JOHNSON:

4
5

field, you know.

6

gander.

7

problem with that.

And so can they.

It's an equal playing

What 's fair for the goose is good for the

I'll play by their rules.

I'm not

I think you'11 feel bette r after this

hearing.
MR. JOHNSON:

10

You know what?

I doubt it.

11

getting dressed up for this hearing, either.

12

T-shirt and Levis.

13

MS. JELTE:

14

MR. JOHNSON:

15

my crew.

16

stupid.

MR. JOHNSON:
principl e.

21

what's j ust is just.

22

25

Joy, you know what?

I have 11 people on

We deal with life and death every single day.

20

24

I'm coming in a

I'm not

I know you're not stupid, but you're talking

stupid right now.

19

23

I'm not

Well, just leave your gun s at home.

MS. JELTE:

17
18

— I don't have a

If they refuse to follow the law, so be it.

MS. JELTE:

8
9

Well, I know people can 1ive through just

MS. JELTE:

2

No, I'm talking justice

There's a difference.

MS. JELTE:

I'm talking

This isn't me —

I m di sappointed in you.

you know,

I think you know

better.
But all that said, you know what?

If I

leave it alone, things are just going to go on as usual.

It's

MR. JOHNSON:

1
1

-241 I just going to keep happening to somebody else.
2

follow the law, and attorney —

3

end sometime.

4

MS. JELTE:

yep.

Judges refuse to

You know what?

It's got to

Look, I'm not going to get in an argument

5

with you about this.

6

clearly, and I think you'11 feel better after the next hearing,

7

and I want you to snap out of it.

8
9
10
11
12
13

I just think that you're just not thinking

I'm sincere as your friend, as your lawyer, as a friend
to your parents, as a friend even to your kids, I really want you
to snap out of it, Jeff.
MR. JOHNSON:

You know better.

Well, I don't have anything planned in the

near future.
(Tape cuts out.

No further proceedings on tape.)
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Utah Code Ann. §76-8-316
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if the person threatens
to assault, kidnap, or murder a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons
and Parole with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the judge
or member of the board while engaged in the performance of the judge's or
member's official duties or with the intent to retaliate against the judge or
member on account of the performance of those official duties.
(2) A person is guilty of a second degree felony if the person
commits an assault on a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons and
Parole with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the judge or
member of the board while engaged in the performance of the judge's or
member's official duties, or with the intent to retaliate against the judge or
member on account of the performance of those official duties.
(3) A person is guilty of a first degree felony if the person commits
aggravated assault or attempted murder on a judge or a member of the
Board of Pardons and Parole with the purpose to impede, intimidate, or
interfere with the judge or member of the board while engaged in the
performance of the judge's or member's official duties or with the purpose
to retaliate against the judge or member on account of the performance of
those official duties.
(4) As used in this section:
(a) "Immediate family" means parents, spouse,
surviving spouse, children, and siblings of the officer.
(b) "Judge" means judges of all courts of record and
courts not of record.
(c) "Judge or member" includes the members of the
judge's or member's immediate family.
(d) "Member of the Board of Pardons and Parole"
means appointed members of the board.
(5) A member of the Board of Pardons and Parole is an executive
officer for purposes of Subsection 76-5-202(1 )(k).
Utah Rule of Evidence 504
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A "client" is a person, including a public officer, or

corporation, association, or other organization or entity, either
public or private, who is rendered professional legal services
by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional legal services.
(2) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably
believed by the client to be authorized, to practice law in any
state or nation.
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to
assist the lawyer in a rendition of professional legal services.
(4) A "representative of the client" is one having
authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on
advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client, or
one specifically authorized to communicate with the lawyer
concerning a legal matter.
(5) A "communication" includes advice given by the
lawyer in the course of representing the client and includes
disclosures of the client and the client's representatives to the
lawyer or the lawyer's representative incidental to the
professional relationship.
(6) A communication is "confidential" if not intended
to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom
disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional
legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for
the transmission of the communication.
(b) General Rule of Privilege. A client
has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing
confidential communications made for the
purpose of facilitating the rendition of
professional legal services to the client between
the client and the client's representatives,
lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and lawyers
representing others in matters of common
interest, and among the client's representatives,
lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and lawyers
representing others in matters of common
interest, in any combination.
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The
privilege may be claimed by the client, the

client's guardian or conservator, the personal
representative of a deceased client, or the
successor, trustee, or similar representative of a
corporation, association, or other organization,
whether or not in existence. The person who
was the lawyer at the time of the
communication is presumed to have authority to
claim the privilege on behalf of the client.
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under
this rule:
(1) Furtherance of Crime or
Fraud. If the services of the
lawyer were sought or obtained to
enable or aid anyone to commit or
plan to commit what the client
knew or reasonably should have
known to be a crime or fraud; or
(2) Claimants Through
Same Deceased Client. As to a
communication relevant to an
issue between parties who claim
through the same deceased client,
regardless of whether the claims
are by testate or intestate
succession or by inter vivos
transaction; or
(3) Breach of Duty by
Lawyer or Client. As to a
communication relevant to an
issue of breach of duty by the
lawyer to the client or by the
client to the lawyer; or
(4) Document Attested by
Lawyer. As to a communication
relevant to an issue concerning a
document to which the lawyer is
an attesting witness; or
(5) Joint Clients. As to a
communication relevant to a
matter of common interest

between two or more clients if the
communication was made by any
of them to a lawyer retained or
consulted in common, when
offered in an action between any
of the clients.

